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Casenote

Standing Room Only: Federal Taxpayers
Denied Standing to Challenge President's
Faith-Based Programs in Hein v. Freedom
from Religion Foundation, Inc.

During the 2006-2007 Term, the United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether federal taxpayers have standing to
challenge the constitutionality of executive expenditures that allegedly
violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.' In
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.,2 the plaintiffs,
asserting standing based on their status as federal taxpayers, objected
to the use of congressional appropriations to fund a faith-based program
created by President George W. Bush as a violation of the Establishment
Clause.3 Although no single analysis commanded five votes, a majority
of the Court agreed to dismiss the case for lack of standing.4 In so

1.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

2. 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
3. Id. at 2559; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. Justice Alito delivered the opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Kennedy, Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2559, Justice Kennedy also wrote a concurring
opinion, id. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring), and Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas,
concurred in the judgment, id. at 2573 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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holding, the Court interpreted the test for taxpayer standing in a way
that treats congressional funds that are distributed pursuant to
congressional authority differently than congressional funds that are
distributed pursuant to executive authority. This inconsistent treatment
of congressional and executive action for standing purposes has both
practical implications for practitioners preparing their course of action
in First Amendment cases and conceptual implications for those
interested in the government's relationship with religion.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 2001 the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives (the "Office") was created pursuant to an executive order
issued by President Bush.' The Office's purpose was to make sure that
"'private and charitable community groups, including religious ones...
have the fullest opportunity permitted by law to compete on a level
playing field. '"' In addition, the President created several Executive
Department Centers for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (the
"Centers"), which had the purpose of ensuring that faith-based groups
maintained eligibility for federal financial support. The Office and
Centers were funded with general congressional appropriations.7
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., (the "Foundation"), an
organization opposed to government endorsement of religion, filed suit
against the directors of the Office and Centers in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, claiming the Office
and Centers violated the Establishment Clause' by promoting religious
programs over secular ones.9 Specifically, the Foundation contended
that the directors organized conferences where faith-based organizations
were "'singled out as being particularly worthy of federal funding...,
and the belief in God [was] extolled as distinguishing the claimed
effectiveness of faith-based social services."'1 ° The Foundation asserted
standing as federal taxpayers opposed to the use of taxpayer funds to
advance religion. The district court dismissed the Foundation's claims
for lack of standing, finding that claims based on taxpayer standing are

5. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2559 (2007).
6. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Exec. Order No. 13, 199, 3 C.F.R. 752 (2002)).
7. Id. at 2560.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2560-61.
10. Id. at 2560 (alteration in original) (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at
73a, Hein, 127 S. Ct. 2253 (No. 06-157).
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limited to challenges against exercises of congressional power, not
executive power."
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed the district court's ruling and held that the Foundation
had standing as federal taxpayers. According to the panel, the programs
provided a basis for taxpayer standing because they were ultimately
financed by congressional appropriations, even if not according to a
specific congressional mandate. Subsequently, the court denied en banc
review."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the issue of whether a taxpayer has standing to challenge
executive expenditures funded by general congressional appropriations. 13 Ultimately, the Court reversed and held that the Foundation
lacked standing to bring the claims.14

II.
A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Introduction

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that5
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."
Before the Establishment Clause was interpreted by the Supreme Court,
some scholars believed that "at the time of the adoption of the [C]onstitution, and of the amendment to it,... the general, if not the universal,
sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state." 6 In one of the earliest cases concerning the
Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court rejected this interpretation
and concluded that the Establishment Clause "was intended to erect 'a
wall of separation between Church and State.'"' 7 This separation was
subsequently described by the Court as "far from being a 'wall,' [but] a
blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.""
One such circumstance is the issue of standing, which is a procedural
device used by courts to dismiss cases regardless of their merit.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 2561.
Id.
Id. at 2559.
Id. at 2562.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.

16.

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

700

(Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833).
17. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
18. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
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Depending on whether the Court interprets the test for standing broadly
or narrowly, standing can be generally available to plaintiffs or only
available in unique circumstances. Consequently, standing has had a
substantial impact on the development of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, and the Court has struggled over the years to develop a
satisfactory test to determine the Establishment Clause standing
requirements. The Hein case is the Court's latest attempt to define
standing.
B.

Taxpayer Status and Standing
In Frothingham v. Mellon, 9 decided in 1923, the Supreme Court
considered for the first time whether an individual's status as a federal
taxpayer was enough to maintain standing in a suit challenging the
constitutionality of federal appropriations."
In Frothingham the
plaintiff challenged a federal statute that provided congressional funding
to state agencies for the purpose of reducing maternal and infant
mortality and protecting the health of mothers and infants.'
The
plaintiff, an individual taxpayer, alleged that "the effect of the statute
will be to take [the plaintiff's] property, under the guise of taxation,
without due process of law."2 2 In determining whether it had jurisdiction, the Court explained that it could review acts of Congress "only
when the justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened,
presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an act."23 The
Court concluded that an individual's status as a federal taxpayer does
not by itself establish standing; otherwise, the courts would be flooded
with claims from millions of taxpayers challenging "every other
appropriation act and statute whose administration requires the outlay
of public money."24 Nevertheless, rather than totally barring federal
taxpayers from ever challenging the constitutionality of federal
appropriations, the Court articulated a standard to determine whether
a taxpayer has standing:
The party who invokes the power must be able to show, not only that
the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement,

19. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

486.
479.
480.
488.
487.

2008]

HEIN V. FREEDOM

1413

and not merely that
he suffers in some indefinite way in common with
25
people generally.
Applying this standard to the plaintiff's claim, the Court held that the
plaintiff did not identify a direct injury and dismissed the case for lack
of standing. 6
C.

Federal Taxpayers and the Establishment Clause

27
In Doremus v. Board of Education,
the Court applied the Frothingham standard in a case in which the plaintiffs alleged that a statute
violated the Establishment Clause.2 8 The New Jersey statute at issue
in Doremus required the reading, without comment, of five verses of the9
2
Old Testament of the Bible at the beginning of each public school day.

In applying the Frothinghamstandard, the Court elaborated on the kind
of injury a taxpayer must demonstrate: "a direct dollars-and-cents
injury."3" The Court held that even when the taxpayer is primarily
motivated by a religious interest, he or she must possess a "financial
interest that is, or is threatened to be, injured by the unconstitutional
conduct" to establish standing.31 In Doremus the Court could not
identify a direct financial injury and dismissed the plaintiffs' claim for
lack of standing.3 2
In Flast v. Cohen," the Court considered another statute that
allegedly violated the Establishment Clause. 4 In Flast the plaintiffs
complained that funds appropriated under a federal statute were being
used improperly to finance instruction in parochial schools.
The
Government encouraged the Court to adopt a position that absolutely
barred taxpayer suits challenging the validity of federal spending
programs.35 In rejecting this position, the Court identified circumstances when a taxpayer would be "a proper and appropriate party to seek
judicial review of federal statutes."3 6 According to the Court, federal

25. Id. at 488.
26. Id. at 488-89.
27. 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
28. Id. at 430.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 434.
31. Id. at 435.
32. Id.
33. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
34. Id. at 85-86.
35. Id. at 98.
36. Id. at 98 n.17. For example, the Court noted that a taxpayer would have standing
to challenge "such palpably unconstitutional conduct as providing funds for the construction
of churches for particular sects." Id.
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taxpayers maintain standing37to challenge federal spending programs by
fulfilling a two-pronged test.
The first prong identified in Flast required the taxpayer to "establish
a logical link between [his or her] status [as a taxpayer] and the type of
legislative enactment attacked."3 8 The Court explained that this prong
reinforced the principle that taxpayers must identify a financial injury
and thus were limited to challenges against exercises of congressional
power under the Taxing and Spending Clause. 39 The direct financial
injury the Court identified in this case was that the taxpayer's "tax
money [was] being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against such abuses of legislative power."4 ° Under
the second prong, "the taxpayer must establish a nexus between [the
taxpayer's] status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged."41 Applying this test, the Court concluded that the
taxpayers in Flast satisfied both prongs and 2had standing to maintain
4
their challenge against the statute at issue.
Of particular importance to the Court in Flast was the plaintiffs'
allegation that the expenditures violated the Establishment Clause.4 3
The Court noted that the drafters of the Establishment Clause feared
that "the taxing and spending power would be used to favor one religion
over another or to support religion in general."44 Accordingly, the
Establishment Clause functions as a "specific constitutional limitation"
on congressional spending power.45 Therefore, the Court held that "a
taxpayer will have standing . . . when he alleges that congressional
action under the taxing and spending clause is in derogation of those
constitutional provisions which operate to restrict the exercise of the
taxing and spending power."4 6 In illustrating this point, the Court
distinguished Frothinghamand explained that the plaintiff in Frothingham "failed to make any additional claim that the harm she alleged
resulted from a breach by Congress of the specific constitutional
limitations imposed upon an exercise of the taxing and spending
"47
power.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 102.
Id.
Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Flast, 392 U.S. at 106.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 103.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 105-06.
Id. at 105.
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D. Flast Applied to Executive Decisions
The Court applied the Flast test in Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. ,48 in which the
plaintiffs challenged a decision of the Secretary of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare as a violation of the Establishment
Clause. The Secretary conveyed government property to Valley Forge
Christian College, which acquired the seventy-seven-acre tract with an
appraised value of $577,500 without making any financial payments.49
The plaintiffs asserted standing as federal taxpayers and contended that
the conveyance deprived them "of the fair and constitutional use of
[their] tax dollar[s]." ° The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing as taxpayers
under the Flast test but nevertheless held that the plaintiffs had
standing as a result of their status as "citizens, claiming 'injury in fact
to their shared individuated right to a government that shall make no
law respecting the establishment of religion.'"'
The Court granted
certiorari to correct the lower court's "unusually broad and novel view
of standing."5 2
Applying the Flast test, the Court agreed with the court of appeals
that the plaintiffs failed the first prong of the test because their
challenge was not directed toward an exercise of congressional power
under the Taxing and Spending Clause; rather, the challenge was
directed to an exercise of congressional power under the Property
Clause.5 3 The Court disagreed with the court of appeals, however,
concerning whether plaintiffs can establish standing on the basis "'that
the Establishment Clause creates in each citizen a personal constitutional right to a government that does not establish religion.'" 54
In
rejecting this approach, the Court explained that "assertion of a right...
cannot alone satisfy the requirements" of standing.55 In addition to a
claim that the Constitution has been violated, the Court held that a
plaintiff must "identify [a] personal injury suffered by [the plaintiff] as

48. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
49. Id. at 468.
50. Id. at 469 (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Id. at 470 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ams. United for Separation
of Church & State v. U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 619 F.2d 252, 261 (3d Cir.
1980)).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 480; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.2.
54. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 483 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ams.
United, 619 F.2d at 265).
55. Id.
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a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the
psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of
conduct with which one disagrees."5 6
In analyzing whether a personal injury existed in Valley Forge, the
Court noted several facts: the property at issue was located in Pennsylvania, the named plaintiffs resided in Maryland and Virginia, the
plaintiffs' organizational headquarters was located in Washington, D.C.,
and the plaintiffs learned about the property conveyance through a news
release.5" The Court distinguished these facts from the facts described
in School District of Abington Township v.Schempp," in which the
plaintiffs' children were directly affected by the law in question because
they were "subjected to unwelcome religious exercises" while attending
public school.59 In light of this comparison, the Court concluded that
the plaintiffs did not "allege[] an injury of any kind, economic or
otherwise, sufficient to confer standing" and reversed the lower court's
decision.6 °
In another notable case, Bowen v. Kendrick,1 the Court held that a
group of federal taxpayers had standing to challenge the Adolescent
Family Life Act 6 2 ("AFLA") as a violation of the Establishment
Clause.'
Pursuant to AFLA, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services distributed federal funds for the purpose of providing care to
pregnant adolescents and adolescent parents." In applying the Flast
test, the Court contrasted Bowen and Valley Forge. 5 Unlike the
plaintiffs in Valley Forge, who asserted standing based on their
challenge to an exercise of executive authority pursuant to the Property
Clause, the plaintiffs in Bowen asserted standing based on their
challenge to an exercise of executive authority pursuant to the Taxing
and Spending Clause. The Government argued that the plaintiffs lacked
standing because they challenged an executive decision and not a
specific exercise of congressional authority under the Taxing and
Spending Clause. 6 In rejecting this argument, the Court explained
that it was arbitrary to distinguish between specific acts of Congress and

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 485.
Id. at 487.
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 487 n.22.
Id. at 486 (emphasis omitted).
487 U.S. 589 (1988).
42 U.S.C. § 300z (2000).
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 618.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 618-19.
Id.
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executive decisions when the program at issue was "at heart a program
of disbursement of funds pursuant to Congress' taxing and spending
powers."67 Accordingly, the Court identified "a sufficient nexus between
the taxpayer's standing as a taxpayer and the congressional exercise of
taxing and spending power, notwithstanding the role the Secretary plays
in administering the statute" and held that68the taxpayers had standing
to challenge the constitutionality of AFIA.
The decision in Bowen essentially resolved the issue of mandated
executive expenditures but left open the issue of discretionaryexecutive
expenditures. Two decades after Bowen, this issue was addressed in
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc.," when the Court
granted certiorari to consider another case concerning executive
decisions that allegedly violated the Establishment Clause. v° In Hein
the plaintiffs, asserting standing based on their status as federal
taxpayers, objected to discretionary executive expenditures financed by
congressional appropriations. 7
A majority of the Court agreed to
dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for lack of standing,7 2 but the Court's
fractured analysis demonstrates that Hein was anything but a straightforward decision.
III.

A.

THE COURT'S RATIONALE

The Plurality Opinion

In Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.,7 the plurality,
led by Justice Alito and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Kennedy, reversed and dismissed the Foundation's claims for lack of
standing." The plurality rejected the Foundation's argument that it
had standing based on taxpayer status on the ground that "the payment
of taxes is generally not enough to establish standing to challenge an
action taken by the Federal Government."75 Instead, the plurality
stated that the Foundation could maintain standing only by demonstrating a "'personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 619-20.
Id. at 620.
127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
Id. at 2561-62.
Id. at 2559.
Id. at 2572.
127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
Id. at 2559.
Id.
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unlawful conduct.' 7 6 The plurality explained that this requirement
screens out taxpayers who "seek 'to challenge laws of general application
where their own injury is not distinct from that suffered in general by
other taxpayers. '"77 According to the plurality, "the interest of a federal
taxpayer in seeing that Treasury funds are spent in accordance with the
Constitution does
not give rise to the kind of redressable 'personal
7
injury' required." 1
Next, the plurality explained that the Flast79 test required the
plaintiffs to "'establish a logical link between [the plaintiffs'] status and
the type of legislative enactment attacked"' and "a nexus between that
status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement
alleged."'8 0 The plurality noted that the expenditures in Flast were
distributed to schools "pursuant to a direct and unambiguous congressional mandate."8 ' On the other hand, the expenditures at issue in Hein
"resulted from executive discretion, not congressional action." 2 Unlike
the plaintiffs in Flast, the Foundation did "not challenge any specific
congressional action or appropriation; nor [did] they ask the Court to
invalidate any congressional enactment or legislatively created program
as unconstitutional."8 3 Therefore, because "[tihe link between congressional action and constitutional violation... [was] missing,"84the Foundation did not satisfy the first requirement of the Flast test.
To further illustrate the factual differences between Flast and Hein,
the plurality distinguished Hein from Bowen v. Kendrick.' In Bowen
the Court held that the plaintiffs satisfied the Flast test because the
expenditures at issue were disbursed by an executive official pursuant
to a congressional mandate.86 In contrast, the expenditures at issue in
Hein were not disbursed pursuant to any congressional mandate; rather,
the expenditures were funded by general congressional appropriations
set aside for the Executive Branch. 7
Next, the plurality addressed the Foundation's argument that it was
"'arbitrary' to distinguish between money spent pursuant to congressio-

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 2562 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
Id. (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613 (1989)).
Id. at 2563.
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
Id. at 2564 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-03).
Id. at 2565.
Id. at 2566.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2567; 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2567.
Id.
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nal mandate and expenditures made in the course of executive discretion, because 'the injury to taxpayers in both situations is the very injury
targeted by the Establishment Clause.'"" In response, the plurality
maintained that the Flasttest was initially developed to address specific
congressional actions that violated the Establishment Clause, and a
narrow interpretation of the Flast test was consistent with the Court's
previous application of the test. 9 Specifically, the plurality noted that
the Court previously declined to apply the Flast test to cases that did not
involve an alleged Establishment Clause violation90 and refused to
extend Flastto permit taxpayer standing in cases that did not implicate
the Taxing and Spending Clause.9 Recognizing that the Court had
never extended Flast to executive expenditures, the plurality decided to
"leave Flast as [it] found it." 92 Furthermore, in declining to extend the

Flast test to include executive expenditures, the plurality sought to
prevent the Court from functioning as "'monitors of the wisdom and
soundness of Executive action."' 93
B. The Concurring Opinions
Both Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia filed concurring opinions.
Justice Kennedy fully supported the plurality opinion on the ground that
the plaintiffs failed to challenge a specific congressional mandate.94
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy filed an opinion to emphasize the
plurality's separation of powers concerns.95 According to Justice
Kennedy, if taxpayers were permitted to challenge discretionary
executive expenditures, the Court would participate in "intrusive and
unremitting judicial management of the way the Executive Branch
performs its duties."9"
Unlike Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, did
not support the plurality's analysis and only concurred in the judgment.97 Characterizing the Court's development of the Flast test as a
series of "utterly meaningless distinctions," Justice Scalia declared that

88. Id. at 2568 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 13, Hein, 127 S. Ct. 2553 (No. 06157)).
89. Id. at 2568-69.
90.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2569; U.S. CONT. art. I. § 8.
Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2572.
Id. at 2570 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 760).
Id. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 2573.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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the Flast test should be abandoned.9 8 Despite his disagreement with
the plurality's analysis, Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment of the
plurality because "[tihe logical consequence of respondents' position finds
no support in this Court's precedents or our Nation's history."99
The primary downfall that Justice Scalia identified in the cases
concerning taxpayer standing was the Court's inconsistent understanding of taxpayer injury.100 Justice Scalia classified two types of injuries:
"'Wallet Injury"' and "'Psychic Injury.'"'01 According to Justice Scalia,
a Wallet Injury involves "a claim that the plaintiff's tax liability is
higher than it would be, but for the allegedly unlawful government
action."" 2 On the other hand, a Psychic Injury involves "the taxpayer's mental displeasurethat money extracted from him is being spent in
an unlawful manner."0 3 Justice Scalia explained that in Frothingham
v. Mellon1" 4 and Doremus v. Board of Education,0 5 the Court flatly
denied standing based on Psychic Injury.10 6 In contrast, the Court
relied on Psychic Injury to support standing in Flast.' v In light of this
inconsistency, Justice Scalia posed a question: "If the taxpayers in Flast
had standing based on Psychic Injury,... why did not the taxpayers in
Doremus and Frothingham have standing on a similar basis?" l
Justice Scalia observed that the Court's acceptance of Psychic Injury in
Flast was fundamentally at odds with its rejection of Psychic Injury in
Frothingham and Doremus.'09 Criticizing the Court for failing to
explain why Psychic Injury was sufficient in some cases but not in
others, Justice Scalia noted that the Court's inconsistent treatment of
taxpayer injury had resulted in a "chaotic set of precedents." 110 In
fact, the court of appeals declined to review this case en banc "simply
because they found [the Court's] cases so lawless that there was no
point, in quite literally, second-guessing the panel."'

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 2573-74.
Id. at 2581.
Id. at 2574.
Id.
Id.
Id.
262 U.S. 447 (1923).
342 U.S. 429 (1952).
Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2575 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 2576.
Id.
Id. at 2579.
Id. at 2584.
Id.
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The Dissenting Opinion

In dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
112
Breyer, criticized the plurality's narrow application of the Flast test.
According to Justice Souter, it was "arbitrary" to distinguish between
executive and legislative expenditures in determining whether the
taxpayer had suffered an injury sufficient to provide a basis for
standing.13 Justice Souter explained that taxpayers suffer the same
injury "[w]hen executive agencies spend identifiable sums of tax money
for religious purposes, no less than when Congress authorizes the same
thing."" 4 Unlike the plurality, which focused on the source of the
expenditures, the dissent examined the purpose of the expenditures.
Justice Souter noted that "there is no dispute that taxpayer money in
identifiable amounts is funding conferences, and these are alleged to
1 5
have the purpose of promoting religion."
In criticizing the plurality's inconsistent treatment of executive and
legislative spending decisions, Justice Souter pointed out that "no one
has suggested that the Establishment Clause lacks applicability to
executive uses of money."" 6 In fact, Justice Souter suggested otherwise: "if the Executive could accomplish through the exercise of
discretion exactly what Congress cannot do through legislation,
Establishment Clause protection would melt away.""'
In comparing
Hein and Bowen, Justice Souter observed that the Court had previously
"recognized the equivalence between a challenge to a congressional
spending bill and a claim that the Executive Branch was spending an
appropriation, each in violation of the Establishment Clause." 8
Seeing no difference between congressional funds that are distributed
according to a specific mandate and congressional funds that are
distributed according to executive discretion, the dissent insisted the
Foundation had taxpayer standing to challenge the President's faithbased program as a violation of the Establishment Clause. 1 9

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2584 (Souter, J., dissenting).
at 2586.
at 2585.
at 2586.
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IMPLICATIONS

Although Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 2 ° is a
fractured decision, it is very informative. The Court effectively created
12
a constitutional barrier to a certain class of Establishment Clause 1
claims by declining to include executive expenditures under the Flast
test.122 Because seven Justices agreed that Flast was the appropriate
test to apply in cases involving taxpayer standing and the Establishment
Clause, Flast still stands as good law; in fact, it remains undisturbed by
this decision. 123 Even though Justices Scalia and Thomas took the
position that the Flast test should be abandoned, they agreed with the
plurality that the requirements for standing should be interpreted
narrowly.1 24 Therefore, in future cases concerning standing, lower
courts should apply a narrow interpretation of the requirements for
taxpayer standing.
Flast and its progeny provide some assistance to practitioners
concerned about structuring a successful claim under a narrow
interpretation of taxpayer standing. In future cases, a claim must
include at least the following characteristics for the taxpayer to maintain
standing: (1) the challenged appropriations must have been distributed
pursuant to a specific congressional mandate; (2) the congressional
mandate at issue must have been created according to Congress's taxing
and spending power; (3) the challenged appropriations must have
violated the Establishment Clause in some way; and (4) the taxpayer
must have alleged a distinguishable personal injury. As indicated by the
legal history, most claims fail to satisfy these narrow requirements and
are dismissed for lack of standing. As a result, practitioners will have
to search for other grounds for standing to challenge executive expenditures under the Establishment Clause.
The most important implication of this case concerns the Court's
troublesome distinction between congressional funds distributed by the
Executive Branch and congressional funds distributed by the Legislative
Branch. The plurality's assertion that this distinction was necessary to
prevent judicial oversight of executive duties is unsatisfactory-why is
judicial oversight of legislative decisions permissible but not judicial
oversight of executive decisions? As noted by Justice Souter in dissent,
the Court's uneven system of review of executive and legislative

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2572.
Id.
Id. at 2573 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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decisions allows the Executive Branch to accomplish through the
exercise of discretion exactly what Congress is forbidden from accomplishing though legislation. 125 That is, unlike Congress, the Executive
Branch may use congressional funds to finance programs designed to
promote religion. Consequently, Congress has an incentive to distribute
congressional funds as general appropriations to the Executive Branch
with the understanding that those funds will be used to finance religious
programs.
In those circumstances, the Executive Branch, mostly
consisting of appointed officials, would be making the kind of policy
decisions the Legislative Branch has traditionally made. This consequence not only distorts the proper role of the branches of government,
but also threatens the original purpose of the Establishment Clause,
which was to prevent the taxing and spending power from being used to
126
favor religion or establish a national religion.
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